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KCON XI ESSAY
HURRAH FOR THE CONSUMER FINANCIAL
PROTECTION BUREAU: CONSUMER
ARBITRATION AS A POSTER CHILD FOR
REGULATION
JEAN R. STERNLIGHT*
I was reminded of Lochner reading some decisions of the Court concerning workers,
consumers, credit card holders who signed agreements saying "if you have a dispute with us,
you can bring it only in arbitration-not in court-andyou cannot use the class action
device. You must sue foryour indiidual claim, which might be 30 dollars, and that's it."
And that has also been described as tied to liberty of contract'
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) recently proposed a
highly controversial regulation limiting companies' ability to use pre-
dispute arbitration clauses to prevent financial consumers from
participating in class actions.' At the same time, the new regulation also
requires companies to be more transparent regarding consumer financial
arbitration-mandating that they file arbitration clauses and arbitral results
with the CFPB.' This Essay examines the propriety of CFPB's actions by
placing them in the larger context of when it is ever appropriate for
government entities to interfere with the "free" market.
In her remarks, quoted above, Justice Ginsburg suggested that the
Supreme Court's recent arbitration decisions are analogous to the Supreme
Court's much maligned Lochner4 decision. That decision, of course,
infamously found that the right to make a contract is part of the "liberty"
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, and further found that state
protective legislation could be voided if it interfered with this freedom of
contract.s Yet, while an enormous literature critiques Lochner' on various
grounds,' its spirit of freedom of contract lives on in some contexts. Can
2. Arbitration Agreements, 81 Fed. Reg. 32,830, 32,830 (May 24, 2016) (to be codified at 12
C.F.R. pt. 1040) [hereinafter Arbitration Agreements]. Note, at the time this Essay went to press, this
regulation had not yet become final, but, rather, had only been proposed and put out for public
comment.
3. Id
4. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), abrogated by W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300
U.S. 379 (1937), and overmled by Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. State of Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952) and
Ferguson v. Skrvpa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963), and.
5. Id at 64 ("[N]or shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property .....
6. As one author notes, "[a]lmost one hundred years after the Supreme Court decided Lochner,
Lochner and its progeny remain the touchstone of judicial error." David E. Bernstein, Lochner's
Legay's Legag, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1, 2 (2003).
7. While everyone loves to hate Locbne, critics differ on whether the case stands for judicial
activism, overvaluing preexisting property rights, or perhaps something else. See Cass R. Sunstein,
Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 874 (1987) (citations omitted). Professor Sunstein argues
that while Lochner is often critiqued as being too activist, perhaps the more significant flaw in its
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a CFPB regulation that constrains consumers' and companies' ability to
enter certain arbitration clauses be justified?
Drawing on economic, psychological and philosophical considerations,
this Essay considers whether consumers should be "free" to "agree" to
contractually trade their opportunity to litigate in a class action for the
opportunity to bring an arbitration claim against a company. The Essay
suggests that by looking at the CFPB's regulation through these three
lenses, one sees that the regulation is desirable-even a poster child-for
the potential value of regulation when market forces are not sufficient to
protect individual or public interests.
Section II of this Essay briefly describes the phenomenon of forced or
mandatory consumer arbitration that has grown up in the United States
over the past thirty years or so.' Section III then considers how
commentators, Congress, and federal regulators have responded to this
issue. This Section focuses particularly on the new proposed CFPB
regulation of financial consumer arbitration. This regulation traces its
lineage to a portion of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act (The Dodd-Frank Act),' passed in the wake of the
mortgage and other financial crises, in which Congress created the CFPB
and ordered it to study and potentially regulate mandatory arbitration in
the consumer financial setting.1 o
Finally, Section IV draws on economics, psychology, and philosophy to
consider the desirability of the new CFPB regulation blocking companies
from requiring consumers to relinquish their ability to participate in class
actions. This Essay concludes that preventing such clauses is entirely
analysis is that it imposes a constitutional requirement of neutrality that seeks to preserve the existing
distribution of wealth and entitlements. Id at 875.
8. Sadly, the growth of this phenomenon largely parallels this author's time in legal academia. I
was an early critic of mandatory arbitration, see Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?:
Debunking the Supreme Court's PreferenceforBindingArbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637 (1996) [hereinafter
Panacea or Corporate Too], and have continued to critique the phenomenon throughout my career. See
Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping MandatoU Arbitration: Is it just?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1631, 1634 (2005)
[hereinafter Creeping Mandatoy Arbitration] (analyzing the phenomenon of arbitration growth); see also
Jean R. Sternlight, As Mandatog Binding Arbitration Meets the Class Action, Will the Class Action Survive?,
42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 6 (2000) [hereinafter Mandatog Binding Arbitration Meets the Class Action]
(arguing against allowing companies to use arbitration as a shield from class action liability). Yet,
despite my efforts and that of many others', forced arbitration is far more common today in both the
consumer and employment setting than it was when I began my anti-mandatory arbitration crusade.
9. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform & Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 5 1028,
124 Stat. 1376, 2003-04 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C § 5518).
10. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, ARBITRATION STUDY: REPORT TO CONGRESS,
PURSUANT TO DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT
5 1028(a) (2015), [hereinafter CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, REPORT TO CONGRESS].
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consistent with protecting consumers' freedom, so long as freedom is
defined in a meaningful way.
11. COMPANIES' USE OF FORCED ARBITRATION IN THE
CONSUMER SETTING
Once upon a time, arbitration was a dispute resolution process that was
adopted knowingly and voluntarily by two or more businesses that
preferred to resolve disputes outside of court." Choosing arbitration over
litigation for its expertise, speed, low-cost, privacy, informality, or other
reasons, companies would enter pre-dispute agreements with one another
to resolve future disputes through arbitration, rather than in court.12 To
ensure that these agreements would be enforced and supported by the
courts, business interests prevailed upon Congress to pass the Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA), which it did in 1925.1' This Act required courts to
enforce written arbitration agreements so long as they were not void on
traditional contract grounds such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability."
For many years, the practice of commercial arbitration and enforcement of
the FAA were not controversial.1 5
Gradually, however, this consensual business-to-business arbitration
gave birth to a different creature, variously known as "mandatory,""
"compelled,"" "forced,"'s or "cram-down"" arbitration. Companies in
11. See IMRE SZALAI, OUTSOURCING JUSTICE: THE RISE OF MODERN ARBITRATION LAWS IN
AMERICA 41-42 (2013) (recounting early history of commercial arbitration in the United States, and
passage of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)); see also IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION
LAW: REFORMATION, NATIONALIZATION, INTERNATIONALIZATION 83-120 (1992) (providing an
excellent short history of the FAA); Edward Brunet, Replacing Folklore Arbitration with a Contract Model
ofArbitration, 74 TUL. L. REV. 39, 43 (1999) (discussing early history of arbitration).
12. See, e.g., Brunet, supra note 11, at 41 (creating the term "folklore arbitration" to describe the
orthodox view and expounding on the phenomena's characteristics).
13. Federal Arbitration Act, Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified at 9 U.S.C. §2
(2012)).
14. Section 2 of the FAA provides in relevant part that written pre-dispute arbitration
agreements "shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in
equity for the revocation of any contract." Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. 5 2 (2012). The
Supreme Court has held that this clause, known as the "saving[s] clause," "permits agreements to
arbitrate to be invalidated by 'generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or
unconscionability"'. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 339 (2011) (quoting Doctors
Assocs. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996)).
15. See general# Panacea or Corporate Too, supra note 8, at 644-60 (discussing the Supreme Court's
evolving interpretation of the FAA from 1925-1983); see also Martin H. Malin, The Three Phases of the
Supreme Court's Arbitration jurisprudence: Empowering the Already-Empowered, 17 NEV. L.J. 23 (2016).
16. Creeping Mandatory Arbitration supra note 8, at 1634 (providing history of the emergence of
mandatory arbitration).
17. David S. Schwartz, Enforting Small Print to Protect Big Business: Employee and Consumer Rzghts
HURRAH FOR THE CFPB
a wide range of businesses have increasingly used small print contracts of
adhesion, envelope stuffers, or online provisions to require consumers,
employees, or others resolve future disputes through arbitration rather
than in court.2 0 These clauses are now widely used by banks and other
lenders, credit card issuers, gyms, schools, medical providers, and many
others.2 1 As the FAA only requires that a clause be written, and not
signed,2 some companies have even used signage over the door to try to
compel customers to arbitrate rather than litigate future disputes.
Although many might have anticipated that courts would find a way to
block this use of arbitration, instead the Supreme Court has interpreted the
FAA broadly to facilitate companies' use of forced arbitration in both the
Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 Wisc. L. REV. 33, 38 (1997) (examining compelled
arbitration in the context of arbitration's favored status).
18. Carmen Comsti, A Metamorphosir: How Forced Arbitration Arrived in the Workplace,
35 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 5, 6 (2014) ("Forced arbitration was transformed from a rarely used
form of dispute resolution into a juggernaut that has changed the nature of statutory enforcement of
worker protection laws in the United States.").
19. See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Do the 'Haves" Come OutAhead in Alternative judicial Systems?:
Repeat Players in ADR, 15 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 19, 39 (1999) (using the term "cram-down
arbitration").
20. I chronicled some of these uses twenty years ago. See Jean R. Sternlight, Rethinking the
Constitutionay of the Supreme Court's Preference for Binding Arbitration: A Fresh Assessment of Jury Trial,
Separation of Powers, and Due Process Concerns, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1, 7-9 (1997) (compiling examples of
arbitration provisions in both common and unique settings, including pest exterminations,
physicians, and cereal boxes). Since that time the usage has only grown. A recent New York Times
article observes that consumer contracts with Amazon, Netflix, Travelocity, eBay, and DIRECTV
contain arbitration clauses, and that even an online site for adulterers, Ashley Madison, also requires
customers to agree to arbitrate future disputes. Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Robert Gebeloff,
Arbitration Evegwhere, Stacking the Deck of Justice, N.Y. TIMES (Oct 31, 2015
http://www.nytimes.com/201 5/11/01 /business/dealbook/arbitration-everywhere-stacking-the-
deck-of-justice.html?_r=0.
21. See, e.g., Christopher R. Leslie, The Arbitration Bootstrap, 94 TEx. L. REV. 265, 269-71 (2015)
(discussing the expanding number of arbitration clauses). The CFPB's recent study discusses the
prevalence of these clauses in the consumer financial context, focusing on use with credit cards,
checking accounts, prepaid cards, payday loans, private student loans, and mobile wireless contracts.
CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 10. One study of the average
consumer found, twenty years ago, that 35.4% of his or her consumer transactions would be covered
by forced arbitration clauses. Linda J. Demaine & Deborah R. Hensler, 'Volunteering" to Arbitrate
Through Predispute Arbitration Clauses: The Average Consumer's Experience, 67 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Winter/Spring 2004, at 55, 62. Even the new craze Pokemon Go is imposing mandatory arbitration
on its users. Pokimon GO Terms of Service, NIANTIC LABS, https://www.nianticlabs.com/
terms/pokemongo/en (last updated July 1, 2016).
22. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
23. Silver-Greenberg & Gebeloff, supra note 20 (noting that "[s]igns posted in a theater in Los
Angeles and a hamburger joint in East Texas informed guests that, simply by walking in, they had
agreed to arbitration").
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consumer and employment contexts.2 Interestingly, the Court has never
directly discussed whether "mandatory" or "forced" arbitration is different
from truly consensual arbitration, but rather has indirectly approved the
use by treating all such arbitration the same." It has repeatedly asserted in
diverse contexts that "arbitration is a matter of contract"26 and that
arbitration agreements must be rigorously enforced according to their
terms." Indeed, the Court has not only accepted such arbitration as
permissible under the FAA, but also stated that such arbitration is
"favored,"" that state efforts to rein in such arbitration are largely
24. Many academics have chronicled the development of Supreme Court case law in this area.
For fairly recent comprehensive examples, see Leslie, supra note 21, at 268-69 (observing that the
Court's recent decisions in Conception and Italian Colors "operate to dismantle entire fields of law,
including laws against fraud, deception, predatory conduct, antitrust violations, and employment
discrimination"); David S. Schwartz, Claim-Suppressing Arbitration: The New Rules, 87 IND. L.J. 239, 250
(2012) ("The broad pattern of Supreme Court decisions in this area has been one of confused
decisions later gelling into clearly bad decisions."); Margaret L. Moses, Statutory Misconstruction: How the
Supreme Court Created a FederalArbitration Law Never Enacted by Congress, 34 FLA. ST. L. REV. 99, 156
(2006) ("Despite concerns expressed by members of the 1925 Congress that arbitration not be
imposed in a 'take-it-or-leave-it' context, the Supreme Court since the 1980s has created a statute
which permits businesses to do exactly that."); Martin H. Malin, supra note 15, at 39; see also Panacea or
Corporate Tool, supra note 8, at 660-73 (examining the Supreme Court's approach to forced arbitration
as of the early 1990s).
25. The Court's first decision implicitly accepting the use of forced arbitration was Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991). In that case, the
Court held that a manager of financial services who had been required to agree to arbitration by his
stock exchange registration form had to arbitrate his age discrimination claim. Id at 20. The Court
treated Mr. Gilmer as having agreed to arbitrate his claims and found that a mere inequality of
bargaining power was insufficient to set aside such agreement absent a showing of fraud or duress.
Id. at 33. A few years later, in Alred-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, the Court held that home owners
were compelled to arbitrate their breach of contract claim against a termite extermination company
where the clause had been contained in a small print contract of adhesion, even though state law
purported to void such uses of compelled arbitration. AIred-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S.
265, 268-70 (1995)
26. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2309 (2013); see also Rent-A-Center,
W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 63 (2010) (referring to an arbitration clause signed by an employee
as condition of employment).
27. See Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. at 2309 (interpreting the FAA strictly); see also Dean Witter
Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985) ("The preeminent concern of Congress in passing
the Act was to enforce private agreements into which parties had entered, and that concern requires
that we rigorously enforce agreements to arbitrate."). Professor Stephen Ware calls the Court's
current approach "very conservative," observing that the Court has made arbitration clauses more
enforceable than other contracts and allows the stripping of traditional appellate rights and the ability
to participate in class actions. Stephen J. Ware, The Poitics ofArbitration Law and Centrt Proposals for
Reform, 53 HARV.J. ON LEGIS. 711, 748-51 (2016).
28. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 339 (2011) (observing, in a case
involving consumer phone contract, that section 2 of the FAA reflects a "liberal federal policy
favoring arbitration," (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24
(1983))); see also Buckeye Check Cashing v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 443 (2006) (finding arbitration
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preempted, 2  and that even lower court findings voiding such clauses on
contractual or statutory grounds must often be overturned."o These
Supreme Court decisions have presumably encouraged companies to use
forced arbitration even more broadly than before, 3 ' because companies
have realized that their clauses are likely to withstand attack in courts,3 2
and that states' attempts to preclude forced arbitration in the consumer
context are quite likely to be struck down as preempted.
In roughly the mid-1990s, some creative attorneys came up with the
idea that companies might use forced arbitration provisions to insulate
themselves from class actions they so despise.3 1 Initially, companies
linked arbitration and class actions by arguing that while the arbitration
clause did not expressly mention class actions, arbitration and class actions
were inherently contradictory in their terms. 3s Some courts bought this
argument and found that arbitration clauses implicitly barred class
actions, 6 but other courts, including ultimately a plurality of the Supreme
"favored" when imposed on consumers by payday lenders).
29. See Doctor's Assocs. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 681 (1996) (preempting a state law requiring
arbitration provisions to appear in certain font size and on the first page of contract); see also Allied-
Bruce Terminix Cos., 513 U.S. at 274-75 (preventing an Alabama law that prohibited companies
from imposing arbitration on a pre-dispute basis); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 491-92 (1987)
(holding preempted a provision of California Labor Law which stated that wage collection actions
may be maintained without regard to existence of any private agreement to arbitrate).
30. See DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463, 463 (2015) (reversing a California appellate
court decision that arbitral class action prohibition imposed on DIRECTV customers was void under
California law); see also Italian Colors Rest., 33 S. Ct. at 2309 (reversing lower court's holding that
arbitral class action should be voided on ground that it would prevent restaurant owners from
vindicating their rights under federal antitrust law); Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 351-52 (holding
preempted a California state court decision finding an arbitral class action prohibition contained in a
consumer's mobile phone contract to be unconscionable).
31. See Mandatoy Binding Arbitration Meets the Class Action, supra note 8, at 5 (reviewing increasing
use of arbitration clauses barring class actions).
32. See Italian Colors Rest., 33 S. Ct. at 2309 (explaining "courts must rigorously enforce
arbitration agreements according to their terms" (quoting Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470
U.S. 213, 221 (1985))).
33. See Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 352 (clarifying that the FAA preempts California's
unconscionability rule affecting waivers of class arbitration in consumer contracts).
34. A recent New York Times story chronicles how banking attorney Alan Kaplinsky and others
joined together to protect their clients from class actions. Silver-Greenberg & Gebeloff, supra note
20; see also Mandatoy Binding Arbitration Meets the Class Action, supra note 8, at 5-6 (detailing industry
efforts in the 1990s to use arbitration clauses to shield themselves from class actions).
35. Alan S. Kaplinsky, Arbitration and Class Actions - A Contradiction in Terms, 1113 PRACTISING
L. INST. 619, 639 (1999) (arguing that arbitrable disputes may not proceed by way of class action in
court or in arbitration unless the arbitration clause explicitly so provides).
36. See, e.g., Champ v. Siegel Trading Co., 55 F.3d 269, 276-77 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding, in a
consumer class action, that arbitral class action was proscribed where clause did not explicitly permit
consolidation or class action). See general# MandatoU Binding Arbitration Meets the Class Action, supra
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Court, found that arbitral class actions might be possible." Companies
responded by writing arbitration clauses that explicitly prohibited persons
subject to the clause from bringing a class claim, or sometimes even a
joined claim, against the company in either litigation or arbitration.
Courts' responses to the express arbitral class action waivers imposed by
companies have been mixed," and also raise some fascinating issues
regarding preemption, federalism, and deference to arbitrators. But, two
recent U.S. Supreme Court cases make clear that, generally, absent new
legislation or administrative regulations, companies will be permitted to
use arbitration clauses to prevent consumers from bringing class actions in
either arbitration or litigation.4 0 In particular, the Supreme Court's
decision in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion4" greatly diminished
consumers' ability to attack class action waivers in arbitration clauses as
unconscionable or otherwise invalid as a matter of traditional contract law.
The 5-4 decision written by the late Justice Scalia held the FAA
preempted a California Supreme Court decision that voided the phone
carrier's clause as unconscionable.4 2 The Court reasoned that the standard
used by the California court was applicable only to arbitration clauses, and
not litigation, and therefore was proscribed by the FAA.4 ' Two years
note 8, at 53-78 (summarizing early case law on this issue).
37. Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 451-53 (2003) (finding, in plurality decision,
that a silent arbitration clause contained in a home improvement loan contract did not foreclose the
possibility of an arbitral class action); see Mandatoy Binding Arbitration Meets the Class Action, supra note
8, at 17-18 (explaining "few cases deal with the questions that arise when class actions must be
reconciled with binding arbitration'; Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, After Class Aggregate Litgation
in the Wake of ATT v. Concepcion, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 623, 629 (2012) (arguing that while some
claims may survive, "most class cases will not survive the impending tsunami of class action
waivers").
38. The clause at issue in AT&T Mobikly LLC v. Conception provided that any claims be brought
in plaintiffs' "individual capacity, and not as a plaintiff or class member in any purported class or
representative proceeding." Conception, 563 U.S. at 336. The relevant clause in Itakan Colors stated
"[t]here shall be no right or authority for any Claims to be arbitrated on a class action basis." Am.
Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2306 (2013). The CFPB's study of the use of
arbitration in the consumer financial context found that almost all the studied clauses prohibited
consumers from participating in class actions. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, REPORT TO
CONGRESS, supra note 10, § 2.5.5, at 45-46.
39. See Pendergast v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 691 F.3d 1224, 1234 (11th Cir. 2012) ('We need not
decide whether the class action waiver here is unconscionable under Florida law . .. because to the
extent Florida law would invalidate the class action waiver, it would still be preempted by the FAA.").
40. See Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 353 (holding the FAA preempted a state judicial ruling); see also
Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. at 2309 (holding arbitration is "a matter of contract ... [which]
require[s] a court to reject [a] merchants' contractual waiver").
41. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011).
42. Id. at 341-42.
43. Id. at 348-50. The Court also found "[c]lass arbitration, to the extent it is manufactured by
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later, in American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant," a 6-3 Court also
undercut consumers' potential argument that such clauses are
unenforceable when they prevent claimants from vindicating federally
protected statutory rights.4 5 Specifically, the Court rejected a group of
restaurant owners' claim that the arbitral class waiver was invalid because it
would block the restaurant owners from effectively vindicating their rights
under federal antitrust law.4 6 Instead, the clause was valid because, at least
in theory, restaurants could pursue their antitrust claims individually."
While the actual case involved restaurant owners seeking to assert an
antitrust claim against American Express, rather than a consumer claim,
lower courts and commentators have not hesitated to apply the reasoning
of the Italian Colors decision to block consumer attempts to void arbitral
class waivers." Indeed, quite a few lower courts have interpreted these
decisions far more expansively than would have been necessary,4 9
essentially giving companies carte blanche to insulate themselves from
consumer financial class actions.
III. POLICY RESPONSES TO THE GROWTH OF MANDATORY
CONSUMER ARBITRATION
Responses to the growth of mandatory consumer arbitration clauses
have been mixed among both commentators and legislators.so Consumer
[court decision] rather than consensual," is inconsistent with the FAA. Id. at 334 (2011).
44. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013).
45. The restaurant owners sought to build on an oft-cited foomote from the Court's prior
decision in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. t. Soler Chrysler-Pymouth. Id. at 2310. In Mitsubishi Motors, the Court
stated arbitration clauses are enforceable only "so long as the prospective litigant effectively may
vindicate its statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum," and noted that if an arbitration clause
"operated ... as a prospective waiver of a party's right to pursue statutory remedies" then the Court
would condemn it. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth 473 U.S. 614, 637 n.19
(1985).
46. Id. at 633-34.
47. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. at 2309-10.
48. For articles collecting some of these cases, see Imre Szalai, More than Class Action Killers: The
Impact of Concepcion and American Express on Emplyment Arbitraion, 35 BERKELEYJ. EMP. & LAB.
L. 31, 42 (2014) ("Many lower courts ... have applied ... fairness factors when reviewing the
enforceability of an arbitration agreement in the employment context."); Jean R. Sternlight, Mandatory
Binding Arbitration Clauses Prevent Consumers from Presenting Procedurally Difficult Claims, 42 Sw. L. REV. 87,
92 (2012) [hereinafter Procedurally Difficult Claims] ("[F]ederal courts [rejected customers'] attempts to
use arbitration to secure the requested injunctive relief.").
49. See Jean R. Sternlight, Tsunami: AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion Impedes Access to Justice,
90 OR. L. REv. 703, 707-17 (2012) (suggesting ways courts might have distinguished Concepcion
decision).
50. See Press Release, Patrick Leahy, U.S. Senator, Leahy Unveils Legislation to Restore the
Rights of Americans from Forced Arbitration, (Feb. 4, 2016),
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groups have been sharply critical of companies' use of mandatory
arbitration in the consumer context, as have many legal academics. 5 1  Such
critics have been particularly tough on companies' use of arbitration to
eliminate consumers' access to class actions.5 2 On the other hand, the
Chamber of Commerce and some academics have defended companies'
use of forced arbitration as either acceptable or even praiseworthy."
https://www.leahy.senate.gov/press/leahy-unveils-legislation-to-restore-the-rights-of-americans-
from-forced-arbitration (quoting Leahy as chastising big business for "tip[ping] the scales" and
"forcing consumers into private arbitration" which he insists denies them of Constitutional
protections); Press Release, Al Franken, U.S. Senator, Franken, Blumenthal Introduce Legislation to
Ensure Access to Justice for Telecommunications Consumers (Apr. 28, 2016),
https://www.blumenthal.senate.gov/newsroom/press/release/blumenthal-franken-introduce-
legislation-to-ensure-access-to-justice-for-telecommunications-consumers (quoting Senator Franken
as stating, "Forced arbitration clauses are often buried in the fine print of agreements we sign each
and every day-like cable, Internet, and cell phone contracts-and they strip away rights from the
American consumer."); Press Release, Jeff Sessions, U.S. Sen. Jeff Sessions, U.S. Senator, Introduces
Consumer and Employee Arbitration Bill of Rights (Oct. 16, 2000), http://www.
sessions.senate.gov/public/index.cfn/news-release?ID=A756CFE0-7E9C-9AF9-7108-C66C91148
A77 (qualifying the Senator's position on arbitration as "believ[ing] the process is a valid alternative
to resolving disputes in court at the cost of skyrocketing legal fees").
51. See Zachary Gima et al., ForcedArbitration: Unfair and Everywhere, PUBLIC CITIZEN 1 (Sept 14,
2009), http://www.citizen.org/documents/UnfairAndEverywhere.pdf (providing detailed research
as to "whether [certain industries] impose binding arbitration on their customers" while also
criticizing arbitration as "impos[ing] onerous costs on consumers, and providjing] extremely little
opportunity for meaningful appeal"); see also Press Release, Nat'l Assoc. of Consumer Advocates &
the Nat'l Consumer L. Ctr., National Association of Consumer Advocates and the National
Consumer Law Center Support Reintroduction of Landmark Legislation to Restore Consumers,
Workers, and Small Businesses' Access to Justice (Apr. 30, 2105),
https://www.nck.org/images/pdf/arbitration/pr-naca-nclc-arbitration-fairness-act-2015.pdf
("[Florced arbitration clauses prohibit individuals and small businesses from holding big banks and
corporations accountable in court, even when corporations violate the law."); Panacea or Corporate Tool,
supra note 8, at 640-63 (sounding an early alarm that consumers and society-at-large should beware
of mandatory arbitration clauses and courts' upholding their validity, and exposing the misguided
evolution of the Federal Arbitration Act); Schwartz, supra note 17, at 36 (decrying as a "monster" the
combination of what he dubs the "authoritarian nature of adhesion contracts" with the "despotic
nature of arbitral decision[-]making").
52. See Lauren Guth Barnes, How Mandatory Arbitration Agreements and Class Action Waivers
Undermine Consumer Rzghts and Why We Need Congress to Act, 9 HARV. L. & POL'Y. REV. 329, 330 (2015)
(remaining optimistic that some "bright spots for consumers remain" despite "the legal landscape" in
class actions "tilting radically towards the powerful"); see also Maureen A. Weston, The Death of Class
Arbitration After Concepcion?, 60 KAN. L. REV. 767, 771 (2012) (condemning the Concepcion majority's
view of the FAA as "dated and deluded"); Gilles & Friedman, supra note 37, at 627 (calling the
Concepcion decision a "comp de grace" to class actions brought by consumers).
53. See Press Release, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, U.S. Chamber Commends Supreme Court
for Preserving Availability of Arbitration to Consumers and Businesses (June 19, 2013),
https://www.uschamber.com/press-release/us-chamber-commends-supreme-court-preserving-
availability-arbitration-consumers-and (praising the use of arbitration as more efficient than litigation
in the tradition court system); see also Peter B. Rutledge, U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform,
Arbitration-A Good Deal for Consumers, 1-2, 31 (April 2008) http://stmedia.startribune.com/
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In Congress, the primary bill introduced in an attempt to eradicate
companies' use of mandatory arbitration in the consumer context is the
Arbitration Fairness Act (AFA), proposed multiple times, most recently in
April 2015." If passed, this law would prevent companies from
mandating the use of arbitration in either consumer or employment
settings.ss However, while the AFA seemed to have real possibility of
passage in 2008, when the Democrats controlled the presidency and both
houses of Congress, it did not even make it to a vote at that time and has
made less progress since.5 6
Congress and various federal agencies have, however, tackled smaller
pieces of the consumer arbitration phenomenon.s" For example, in 2007
documents/docload.pdf (attempting to dismantle the claims made in the Public Citizen publication
and claiming that arbitration is less costly and overall better for consumers); Stephen J. Ware, The
CaseforEnfordngAdhesive Arbitration Agreements with Particular Consideration of Class Actions andArbitration
Fees, 5J. AM. ARB. 251, 252-54 (2006) (building a case to justify upholding mandatory arbitration
clauses and calling them "socially desirable"); c Ware, sepra note 27, at 724, 751 (asserting that the
Supreme Court's recent decisions go too far in that they allow companies to use arbitration to
achieve ends, such as elimination of class actions, that would not be permitted in other contractual
contexts).
54. Arbitration Fairness Act of 2015, S. 1133, 114th Cong. (1st Sess. 2015). A version of this
Act was first introduced in 2007. Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007, S. 1782, 110th Cong. (1st Sess.
2007); see also Restoring Statutory Rights and Interests of the States Act of 2016, S. 2506, 114th Cong.
(2d Sess. 2016) (proposing to invalidate certain arbitration agreements that would mandate arbitration
of claims regarding violations of federal or state law).
55. See S. 1133 (declaring in the findings that "[m]andatory arbitration undermines the
development of public law"). Note that the precise text of the bill has changed over time. See, e.g.,
S. 1782 (proscribing forced arbitration of consumer, employment, franchise, and civil rights claims).
56. In 2009, although the Democrats controlled the White House and both Houses of
Congress, the AFA still did not get reported out of the House Financial Services Committee, though
it was chaired by supporter Representative Barney Frank. See George H. Friedman, The Prsposed
Arbitration Fairness Act Still a Well-Intended but Potentially Dangerous Overreacton to a Legitimate Concern,
ARB. RESOL. SERVS., INC., https://www.arbresolutions.com/the-proposed-arbitration-faimess-act-
stil-a-well-intended-but-potentiay-dangerous-overreaction-to-a-legimate-concer/ (last visited
Mar. 2, 2017) (explaining there were multiple failed attempts at "amend[ing] the FAA to limit or ban
[the] use of mandatory arbitration on consumer contracts"). More recent bills similarly failed to
make it to even a committee vote. See Arbitration Fairness Act of 2013, S. 878, 113th Cong. (1st
Sess. 2013) (showing the only action on the Bill taken by the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
since its introduction on May 5, 2013, has been "Introduction and Referral" and "Committee
Consideration"); S. 1133 (revealing the only action on the Bill has been "Introduction and Referral"
by the Senate Committee on the Judiciary).
57. Congress has also regulated aspects of compelled arbitration outside the consumer setting.
See Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-118, § 8116, 123 Stat.
3409, 3454-55 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C 5 8102 (2012))(prohibiting federal contractors who
receive Department of Defense funds from requiring their employees or independent contractors to
arbitrate certain claims); 21st Century Department of Justice Appropriations Authorization Act, Pub.
L. No. 107-273, 5 11028(a)(2), 116 Stat. 1758, 1835-36 (2002) (codified at 15 U.S.C. 5 1226(a)(2)
(2016)) (proscribing imposition of arbitration in motor vehicle franchise contracts); Food,
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Congress adopted legislation that proscribes the use of mandatory
arbitration with respect to loans to members of the military." In the
regulatory setting the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has, since 1975,
prohibited the use of forced arbitration in consumer warranty agreements
covered by the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act.5" In 1992, the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) approved a rule issued by the Financial
Industry Regulatory Authority (the self-regulatory body for the securities
industry) that precludes securities dealers from using arbitration to block
class actions.6 o Recently the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
(CMS) proposed a rule to limit the use of arbitration agreements in long
term care facilities."1 And, the Department of Education (DOE) recently
commenced a negotiated rulemaking process to limit or regulate the use of
arbitration agreements as a means of blocking group claims by students at
for-profit colleges.62
Consistent with this targeted approach to regulating consumer
arbitration, Congress addressed arbitration several times in the Dodd-
Frank Act, passed in the aftermath of the financial crisis in 2010.6 This
Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-234, § 11005, 122 Star. 923, 1356-58
(codified at 7 U.S.C. § 197c (2016)) (restricting use of arbitration in livestock or poultry contracts).
58. See John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Pub. L.
No. 109-364, § 670, 120 Stat. 2083, 2266-68 (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 987 (2012))
(prohibiting use of arbitration clauses in loans to active service members and their families).
59. 16 C.F.R § 703.5() (2016). After two appellate courts questioned the interpretation of this
regulation, the FTC promulgated a final rule in 2015 to reaffirm its position that the Magnuson Moss
Warranty Act proscribes the use of mandatory binding arbitration with respect to warranties. Final
Action Concerning Review of the Interpretations of Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 80 Fed. Reg.
42,710, 42,719 (July 20, 2015).
60. See Order Approving Proposed Rule Change Relating to the Exclusion of Class Actions
from Arbitration Proceedings, 57 Fed. Reg. 52,659 52,659-61 (Nov. 4, 1992) (ruling certain criteria
must be met before a person can enforce an arbitration agreement over the subject of a certified class
action against a person that is part of that certified class action suit).
61. Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Reform of Requirements for Long Term Care Facilities,
81 Fed. Reg. 68,688 (Oct. 4, 2016) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 405, 431, 447, 482, 483, 485, 488,
489).
62. Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Educ., U.S. Dep't of Educ. Takes Further Steps to Protect
Students from Predatory Higher Educ. Insts. (Mar. 11, 2016) http://www.ed.gov/news/press-
releases/education-department-proposes-new-regulations-protect-students-and-taxpayers-predatory-
institutions; see also Student Assistance General Provisions, 81 Fed. Reg. 38,9330, 38,9334-35
(June 16, 2016) (proposing to "[a]mend [Section] 685.300 to ... prohibit the use of pre-dispute
mandatory arbitration agreements by schools"); Dfenses to Repayment of Federal Student Loans: Pubc
Hearing on Negotiated Rulemaking, U.S. Dep't of Educ., Office of Postsecondary Educ., Transcript of
Public Hearing at 6-7 (Sept. 16, 2015), https://www 2 .ed.gov/policy/highered/reg/hearulemaking/
2016/transcript-sfpubhearing-09162015.doc (discussing the impact of mandatory arbitration on
students and recent use of defenses by students against higher education institutions).
63. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124
Stat. 1376, 1376 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5301).
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bill, intended to promote the financial stability of the country by reforming
financial markets,6 created the CFPB.6 s While arbitration was not a
primary focus of the Act, section 1028(a) mandated that the CFPB study
"the use of agreements providing for arbitration of any future dispute ...
in connection with the offering or providing of consumer financial
products or services." 6' Section 1028(b) of the Dodd-Frank Act further
authorized the CFPB to issue regulations prohibiting use of arbitration or
imposing conditions on its use, regarding "consumer financial product[s]
or service[s] ... if the Bureau finds that such a prohibition or imposition
of conditions or limitations is in the public interest and for the protection
of consumers." 6' The Dodd-Frank Act also prohibited the use of forced
arbitration in residential mortgage contracts, 6' authorized the SEC to issue
rules prohibiting or regulating the use of arbitration by investment
advisers, 6' and proscribed the use of forced arbitration in connection with
some whistleblower proceedings.70
Pursuant to section 1028(a) of the Dodd-Frank Act," the CFPB
commenced to study the use of arbitration in the consumer financial
context in 2012. After soliciting suggestions on how to conduct such a
study,7 2  receiving and incorporating ideas from many corners, and
spending three years collecting and analyzing massive amounts of data, the
CFPB produced a comprehensive and impressive report in March 2015."
64. Id.
65. Id. at 1964 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5491).
66. Id. at 2003 (codified at 12 U.S.C. 5 5518(a)).
67. Id at 2004 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5518(b)).
68. See id at 2151 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1639c(e)(1)) ("No residential mortgage loan ... may
include terms which require arbitration. . . .").
69. Id. at 1841 (codified at 15 U.S.C. 5 80b-5(f).
70. Id. at 1848 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(e)).
71. Id. at 2003 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5518(a))
72. Request for Information Regarding Scope, Methods, and Data Sources for Conducting
Study of Pre-Dispute Arbitration Agreements, 77 Fed. Reg. 25,148 (Apr. 27, 2012).
73. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 10. The Report was
voluminous-ten sections and almost four hundred pages excluding appendices. Id. It examined the
prevalence of pre-dispute arbitration clauses in the consumer financial sector, the typical features of
such clauses, what consumers understand about dispute resolution, the types of claims brought in
arbitration and how they are resolved, the types of claims brought in litigation and how they are
resolved, consumers' use of small claims courts, the value of class action settlements, the relationship
between public enforcement and consumer financial class actions, and whether companies' use of
mandatory arbitration led to lower prices for consumers. Id. This Report was preceded by a
Preliminary Report in late 2013. CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU, ARBITRATION
STUDY: REPORT TO CONGRESS, PURSUANT TO DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND
CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT (2013).
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Many in the field enthusiastically welcomed the Report" because it is well
recognized that there has been a dearth of solid empirical information
regarding the impacts of mandatory consumer arbitration." While studies
have been conducted by a variety of organizations and academics, and
many have been very useful," those on both sides of the issue have
repeatedly emphasized the need for more and better studies. It is well
recognized by all sides that it is inherently difficult to study a private
process." The CFPB could not solve every research problem, but at least
it could use its resources and authority to obtain information not
previously made available, and without having to rely , on outside
funding.7
74. See, e.g., Letter from Law Professors, to Office of the Exec. Sec'y, Consumer Fin. Prot.
Bureau, 1, 2 (May 23, 2016) (on file with author) (calling the CFPB study "comprehensive and
impressive" and noting the need for "more and better data-driven studies" with respect to mandatory
arbitration). Some analysts, however, have critiqued the study. See Jason Scott Johnston & Todd
Zywicki, The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau's Arbitration Study: A Summary and Critique 2 (George
Mason Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 15-25, 2015), http://www.law.gmu.edu/assets/files/
publications/workingpapers/LS1507.pdf (contending the study lacks pertinent data to analyze the
efficacy of arbitration clauses). But while, as those authors suggest, more data is always desirable, this
author believes that the CFPB's studies have more than adequately shown that class actions are
helping consumers and the public in ways that a very small number of individual arbitrations are not.
75. See CARRIE MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL., DIsPUTE RESOLUTION: BEYOND THE
ADVERSARIAL MODEL 478-79 (2d ed. 2011) (discussing the challenges of empirical inquiry and
noting that those who have done empirical work in the area "spend a great deal of time critiquing
each others' conclusions and debating the burden of proof"); see also David Horton & Andrea Cann
Chandrasekher, After the Revolution: An Empirical Study of Consumer Arbitration, 104 GEO. L.J. 57, 62
(2015) (discussing challenge of answering "empirical questions about a system that does not lend
itself to empirical inquiry").
76. There are many examples of helpful, recent studies. See Judith Resnik, Diffusing Dirputes: The
Publc in the Private ofArbitration, the Private in Courts, and the Erasure ofRights, 124 YALE L.J. 2804, 2812
n.25 (2015) (studying data posted by the AAA under mandate of laws of various jurisdictions); see also
Horton & Chandrasekher, supra note 75, at 63 (examining arbitration complaints filed by consumers
with the American Arbitration Association between 2009 and 2013).
77. See Thomas J. Stipanowich, The Third Arbitration Trilogy. Stolt-Nielsen, Rent-A-Center,
Concepcion and the Future of American Arbitration, 22 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 323, 422-25 (2011)
(complaining about the difficulty of obtaining "reliable data on largely private arbitration processes").
Neither companies nor arbitration providers have to open their files to interested researchers. Id.
While some jurisdictions have required arbitration providers to supply certain data, researchers have
often found the produced data to be sketchy. Id. Moreover, researchers cannot legitimately conclude
that results obtained from one arbitration provider are predictive of what they might find in the files
of another arbitration provider. Id. And, some studies have been critiqued based on being funded by
an interested group. Id.
78. The CFPB has described various ways in which its study "drew in part upon data sources
previously unavailable to researchers." Arbitration Agreements, supra note 2, at 32,840. Some of this
information was provided voluntarily, and some of the information was procured by the Bureau
from financial service providers by submitting orders pursuant to its market monitoring authority
under the Dodd-Frank Act, Section 1022(c)(4). See id. (mentioning the CFPB used its "market
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Four main CFPB conclusions are worth emphasizing. First, the CFPB's
study reveals that the vast majority of consumers do not enter into
arbitration agreements knowingly or consensually in any meaningful sense
of those words.7 ' Second, very few consumers actually bring arbitration
claims pertaining to financial matters.8 o Third, CFPB found that the
major impact of mandatory consumer arbitration in the financial setting is
that it precludes consumers from participating in class actions that might
be brought on their behalf and thereby brings value both to individual
consumers and to society as a whole."' Specifically, it stated "that
arbitration agreements have the effect of blocking a significant portion of
class action claims that are filed and of suppressing the filing of others."
Fourth, the CFPB found that "the class action mechanism is a more
effective means of providing relief to consumers for violations of law or
contract affecting groups of consumers than other mechanisms available
to consumers, such as individual formal adjudication (either through
judicial or arbitral fora) or informal efforts to resolve disputes."83
Expanding on this a bit, the CFPB explained that whereas millions of
financial consumers who are not subject to pre-dispute arbitration clauses
receive benefits through class actions, only a minute portion of consumers
covered by arbitration clauses actually choose to bring arbitration claims.84
Specifically, the Report found that between 2010 and 2012, only a few
hundred financial consumers filed arbitration claims with the American
Arbitration Association (AAA), even though the AAA handles more
consumer arbitration claims than any other arbitration provider."
Moreover, of the arbitration claims that were brought by individual
consumers, most involved claims of over $1,000. In other words, a
miniscule number of consumers bring individual arbitrations to recover
low-dollar claims. 86
monitoring" power to obtain certain information).
79. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 10, § 3.1, at 3-4.
80. Id. at %§ 5.2.1, 5.5.1, at 9, 19.
81. Id. at 5 8.1, at 3-5.
82. Arbitration Agreements, supra note 2, at 32,859.
83. Id. Additionally, the Bureau found public enforcement is not a sufficient means to enforce
consumer protection laws. Id. at 32,860.
84. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 10, § 5.5.1, at 19.
85. The CFPB Report, in sections 5.2.1 and 5.5.1 identified 1,847 AAA consumer arbitration
disputes involving credit cards, checking accounts, payday loans, GPR prepaid cards, auto purchase
loans, or private student, loans, but it also noted that a substantial number of these disputes were filed
by the company rather than the consumer and/or involved claims of unpaid consumer debts rather
than affirmative claims brought by consumers. Id at § 5.2.1, at 9; Id. at § 5.5.1, at 19.
86. The CFPB's study of six product markets found only approximately twenty-five claims per
3572016]
ST. MARY'S LAWJOURNAL [o
Another way to summarize this aspect of the CFPB's results is that
rather than encouraging and allowing more financial consumers to bring
claims, forced arbitration clauses employed in the financial sector suppress
claims consumers might otherwise have brought in class actions. It is easy
to see why consumers are reluctant to bring claims individually. First,
many individual claims against companies that provide consumer financial
services and products are worth only small amounts of money. As Judge
Posner put it, "The realistic alternative to a class action is not 17 million
individual suits, but zero individual suits, as only a lunatic or a fanatic sues
for $30.""87 It simply is not vorth a consumer's time or trouble, nor a
lawyer's, to pursue a small claim. Second, it is difficult to obtain legal
representation to bring low-value individual claims because consumers
typically cannot afford to pay attorneys an hourly rate to represent them
on such a claim, and attorneys cannot afford to handle these claims on a
contingent fee basis." Third, individual consumers may not be aware that
a financial services company has harmed them or that the harm was
unlawful. For example, a consumer might well not realize they were
charged an improper interest rate or discriminated against on the basis of
their race with respect to a loan rate. 9 By contrast, class proceedings are
well designed to deal with each of these problems because they allow
many small claims to be grouped together, make it easier for financial
consumers to obtain representation, and allow financial consumers who
may not realize they have been wronged to participate in a class action
where their rights can be adjudicated.9 0
In other words, one of the harmful consequences of pre-dispute
arbitration clauses containing class action waivers is that they suppress
claims that consumers might otherwise bring. While it is true that fairly
few consumers file individual claims to vindicate their legal rights, this is
not necessarily because they lack valid claims; rather, most consumers are
simply unaware that they have been harmed, unaware that the harm
violates a law, or have decided that filing individual arbitration claims is
not worth their time and expense.91 Yet, from both an individual and
year brought by consumers seeking affirmative relief of $1,000 or less. Id. at 5.2.1, at 9. Similarly,
another study looking at a broader array of consumer arbitration claims found less than 4% of the
claims were brought for $1,000 or less. Horton & Chandrasekher, supra note 75, at 117.
87. Carnegie v. Household Int'l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004).
88. Procedural# Dficult Claims, supra note 48, at 109.
89. Id. at 112-13.
90. Id. at 119-20.
91. When consumers are aware of being wronged they may raise complaints internally with
companies, file with a government agency, or seek protection from a credit card company if
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societal standpoint, it can be important to allow such claims to be brought.
Nor is there reason to believe, as some have suggested, that consumers
would bring more individual arbitration claims against financial service
providers if only they were better educated about the purported virtues of
arbitration. Rather, a consumer who was truly well informed about
consumer arbitration would likely conclude that-given the financial and
other costs of arbitration and the limited likelihood of success-it makes
absolutely no sense to file an individual arbitration claim." Thus, the
CFPB concluded that if we want to ensure the enforcement of substantive
laws protecting consumers, we need to preserve consumer class actions.9 3
Based on its study, the CFPB proposed regulation CFPB-2016-0020 on
May 7, 2016.9' This regulation "would prohibit providers from using a
pre-dispute arbitration agreement to block consumer class actions in court
and would require providers to insert language into their arbitration
agreements reflecting this limitation."s Because the Bureau found the
evidence "inconclusive as to the relative efficacy and fairness of individual
arbitration compared to individual litigation,"9 6 it did not propose to
prohibit companies' imposition of pre-dispute arbitration clauses in the
financial consumer context.9 7  However, because the Bureau remains
concerned about "the potential for consumer harm" if companies mandate
individual arbitration," it proposed to monitor the use of individual
arbitration in the financial consumer setting.9 9  Specifically, it "would
require providers that use pre-dispute arbitration agreements to submit
certain records relating to arbitral proceedings to the Bureau."1 o The
CFPB has stated an intent to publish redacted or aggregated versions of
this information on its website.' This monitoring would provide greater
appropriate, rather than engage in more difficult and expensive litigation or arbitration. Id. at 101-02.
92. Id. at 113-19.
93. Arbitration Agreements, supra note 2, at 32,858 ("The Bureau preliminarily finds, based on
the results of the Study and its further analysis, that the class action procedure provides an important
mechanism to remedy consumer harm.").
94. Id. As noted earlier, this regulation has not been finalized by the CFPB.
95. Id. at 32,830.




100. Id. at 32,830. In particular, the proposed regulation would require regulated companies to
provide to the CFPB two categories of information: (a) claims, clauses, and judgments (if any)
relating to consumer arbitration filings and (b) any determinations by arbitrators or arbitration
providers to the effect that a particular arbitration agreement does not comply with relevant fairness
principles. Id at 32,868.
101. Id. at 32,893.
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transparency to the process while also allowing the Bureau to more fully
consider, in the future, whether additional regulation might be
desirable.' 0 2
IV. CONSIDERINGJUSTIFICATION OF THE PROPOSED CFPB RULE
The remainder of this Essay will consider whether-in light of relevant
economics, psychology, and political philosophy-the empirical findings
made by the CFPB indeed justify the rule it has proposed. One way to
think about whether the proposed regulation is justified is to consider
whether, from an economic standpoint, market forces will adequately
protect consumers such that there is no need for regulation. Or, are there
any psychological principles at play that might lead us to either support or
reject the need for regulation? Finally, what about principles of
freedom-should the regulation be rejected to support consumers'
purported freedom of contract and autonomy? The analysis below shows
that the proposed CFPB rule is well justified using each of these three
lenses.
A. Economics
1. Absence of Perfect Competition
Advocates for the virtues of free markets and perfect competition might
suggest that the CFPB regulation is either unnecessary or undesirable given
the powerful forces of perfect competition. Such persons would suggest
that regulation is unnecessary because market forces would ensure that any
contractual provisions are vetted by all parties to ensure all maximize their
wellbeing.' 03 A number of commentators have noted that the Supreme
Court and others often justify favorable treatment of arbitration by
drawing on freedom of contract princiles.o As a corollary to this
102. Id. at 32,868.
103. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD 76 (1995) ("[A]ll
voluntary exchanges are positive-sum games for the participants. Exchange does not merely transfer
physical or intangible assets. It increases human satisfaction.by matching assets with the persons
who value them most.'); Stephen J. Ware, Consumer Arbitraion As Exceptional Consumer Law (With a
Contractualist Response to Carnington & Haagen), 29 MCGFORGE L. REV. 195, 211 (1998) [hereinafter
Consumer Arbitradon As Exceptional Consumer Lau] (observing that the "process of exchange is
tremendously beneficial" because it "makes both parties to a contract better off than they were
without the contract"); see also Amy J. Schmitz, Remedy Realies in Business-to-Business Consumer
Contracing, 58 ARIZ. L. REV. 213, 217-18 (2016) (noting traditional contract doctrine counsels in
favor of formalistic disclosure rules rather than substantive consumer protection in order to
supposedly foster "an optimal allocation of resources").
104. See J. Maria Glover, Disappearing Claims and the Erosion of Substanive Law, 124 YALE L.J.
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principle, the work of some free market advocates suggests that by
regulating this consumer market, the CFPB will cause prices of consumer
products and services to rise, potentially thereby hurting more consumers
than it helps.1 o5
So, let us briefly explore whether, in fact, principles of economics
oppose the sort of market regulation imposed by the CFPB pursuant to
the power afforded that agency by the Dodd-Frank Act. 0 6 That is,
absent regulation, will the forces of the market and the so-called inisible
hand ensure that market participants' interests are protected and their
"utility" (i.e. happiness) is maximized? Ecdnomists have shown that in a
theoretical world .of "perfect competition," regulation is not needed
because consumers will seek out the deals that are best for them, and
3052, 3070 (2015) (observing that the Supreme Court has established "a vision of arbitration as pure
freedom of contract'; see also THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF
ARBITRATION 49 (5th ed. 2014) (noting that "[flreedom of contract is the primary legal concept that
governs the law, practice, and regulation of arbitration in the vast majority of national jurisdictions,
including the United States"); Steven W. Feldman, Italian Colors and Freedom of Contract Under the
Federal Arbitration Act: Has the Supreme Court Enabled Disappearing Claims and the Erosion of Substantive
Law?, 2016 MICH. ST. L. REV. 109, 109-10 (2016) (countering Professor Glover's attack on recent
Supreme Court arbitration jurisprudence and, instead, defending the Supreme Court's reliance on
freedom of contract principles while also recognizing that freedom of contract can be tempered by
appropriate regulation).
105. See Stephen J. Ware, Paying the Price of Process: Judiial Regulation of Consumer Arbitration
Agreements, 2001 J. DISP. RESOL. 89, 89-90 (2001) (urging judicial regulation of arbitration raises
consumer prices and may well not be justified, depending on benefits of that regulation); Stephen J.
Ware, Arbitration Under Assault- Trial Lauyers Lead the Charge, CATO INST. (Apr. 18, 2002),
http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-433es.html [hereinafter Arbitration Under Assault] (emphasizing
that measures prohibiting mandatory arbitration would likely harm consumers by raising prices); see
also CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 10, § 10, at 2 (observing
that some commenters, particularly the Chamber of Commerce, asked the CFPB to "explore whether
pre-dispute arbitration clauses lower the price of financial services to consumers[,]" and citing
literature regarding the potential "pass through" of company cost savings). However, Professor
Ware has recently recognized that it is appropriate to regulate forced arbitration to prevent
companies from using arbitration to eliminate class actions or to prevent appeals. See Ware, supra
note 27, at 718 ("U.S. law generally does not routinely enforce adhesion contract terms
'waiving'. . . the right to be a part of a class action, [so] courts should not routinely enforce adhesive
arbitration agreements trading away the right to be a part of a class action.").
106. Many others have broadly examined the application of economic analysis to form
contracts. See FLORENCIA MAROTIA-WURGLER, 'Unfair Dispute Resolution Clauses: Much Ado About
Nothing?, in BOILERPLATE: THE FOUNDATION OF MARKET CONTRACTS 45 (Omri Ben-Shahar, ed.
2007) (rationalizing dispute resolution clauses as necessary to keep sellers' costs down); Aditi Bagchi,
At the Limits of Adjudication: Standard Terms in Consumer Contract, in COMPARATIVE CONTRACT
LAW 446 (L. DiMatteo & M. Hogg, eds. 2015) ("The mechanism on which we rely to achieve
efficient terms [in a contract] is the market."); Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-
Form Contracting in the Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429, 447 (2002) (suggesting consumers should
trust boilerplate terms in contracts with competitive businesses because they properly "minimize the
overall costs of the good or service").
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companies that are treating consumers unfairly or harming them will be
driven out of business. 0 7  The theory is beautiful-even compelling-
but, the question is whether or when it exists in reality.1 os
The four generally recognized conditions for perfect competition are as
follows:
(1) There should be a sufficient number of small buyers and sellers such that
no single buyer nor seller can influence the market price. No seller should
produce a large percentage of the total market output;
(2) The good or service produced should be homogeneous, so that no firm
produces a unique product;
(3) Entry and exit into the market should be very easy. No significant
barriers to entry should exist such as licenses, economies of scale, high
capital setup costs, or brand loyalty; and
(4) All buyers and sellers should have very good access to relevant
information such as prices, quality and characteristics of goods, and costs of
production. 10 9
The first three conditions all pertain to the sellers of financial goods and
services, and it appears that they are rarely, if ever, fulfilled in the
consumer financial sector. While the number of sellers varies substantially,
depending on the particular financial product or service, it generally ranges
from very few (mobile wireless phone providers)1 o to relatively few
(banks and credit card providers)."' Thus, condition one is not met.
107. "Moving beyond a single perfectly competitive market, economists have proven that an
entire economy that consists only of perfectly competitive markets will have an efficient allocation of
all resources without any government regulation." NEVA GOODWIN, ET AL., MICROECONOMICS IN
CONTEXT 351 (3d ed. 2014); see also ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD,
MICROECONOMICS 609 (8th ed. 2013) (discussing the economic efficiency of competitive markets
and explaining that such a general equilibrium is a means of "illustrating the workings of Adam
Smith's famous invisible hand').
108. See PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 107, at 625 (discussing markets may failure can
caused by market power, incomplete information, externalities, and public goods).
109. WALTER NICHOLSON & CHRISTOPHER M. SNYDER, MICROECONOMIC THEORY: BASIC
PRINCIPLES AND EXTENSIONS 449 (12th ed. 2016); PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 107, at 631
(8th ed. 2013); see also Jean R. Sternlight & Elizabeth J. Jensen, Using Arbitration to Elminate Consumer
Class Actions: Efficient Business Pratice or Unconscionable Abuse?, 67 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 75, 93-94
(2004) (acknowledging the four generally recognizable conditions of perfect competition, but
wondering whether "these conditions [are] likely to be met in the real world, where companies are
mandating arbitration and eliminating class actions").
110. James W. Brock, Economic Concentration and Economic Power John Fynn and a Quarter Centug of
Merges, 56 ANTITRUST BULL. 681, 701 (2011) (observing that AT&T and Verizon control 80% of
local exchange revenues across the country).
111. Id. at 718-20 (discussing substantial recent consolidations in banking industry in recent
years).
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Similarly, while at first glance one might say that all credit cards, banks, or
phone services are pretty much the same, these products and services are
not entirely homogeneous, and thus the second condition is not met.
Rather, companies try to distinguish their products based on interest rates,
price, and other factors. Consumers do not easily exchange one bank or
credit card provider or phone company for another.1 1 2 This is not
surprising because switching products and services is often costly for
consumers, in terms of time, convenience, and sometimes substantial
fees.11 ' Finally, the third condition is not met because fields such as
banking, lending, and telephone service are heavily regulated, and thus new
companies cannot easily enter the field.11
Nor can it be realistically be claimed that the fourth condition of perfect
competition is met. It is not true that all buyers of consumer financial
products have very good access to information about the arbitration
clauses often contained in consumer financial contracts.1 1 5  While
theoretical access may exist, to the extent consumers are provided with
documents or access to websites containing the information, in reality the
documents are often too long, too technical, or too buried for consumers
to understand their provisions. Multiple studies, including the study done
by the CFPB, have shown financial consumers do not focus on arbitration
clauses and generally are not aware of what they mean." Specifically, the
112. The Pew Charitable Trust surveyed banking consumers and found only 38% hypothetically
said they would close their account if they had a problem with their bank. Susan Weinstock &
Thaddeus King, CFPB to Act on Banking Dispute Resolution: Proposal Would Protect Class-Action Rsghts,
PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS (Feb. 16, 2016), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/
analysis/201 6/02/16/cfpb-to-act-on-banking-dispute-resolution. Presumably the number of
consumers who would actually switch is far lower, given the inevitable hassles of life.
113. Sternlight & Jensen, supra note 109, at 94.
114. Id. at 94-95.
115. Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 STAN. L. REV. 211,
241 (1995) ("[Tihe meaning and effect of the preprinted provisions will very often be inaccessible to
laypersons .... Even if the terms are written clearly, however, the form taker usually will be unable
fully to understand their effects, because ... most consumers do not know their baseline rights.").
Further, it does not appear, as some have suggested, that a minority of educated consumers can
protect their less educated peers. Schmitz, supra note 103, at 238.
116. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 10, § 3.1, at 3-4.
These results are largely consistent with other studies. See Jeff Sovern et al., "Whimsy Little Contracts"
with Unexpected Consequences: An Empirical Anaysis of Consumer Understanding of Arbitration Agreements,
75 MD. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (2016) (reporting on findings from an empirical study exploring consumer
awareness and understanding of arbitration clauses); see also Banking on Arbitration: Big Banks,
Consumers, and Checking Account Dispute Resolution, PEW CHARITABLE TRUST, Nov. 2012, at 1, 1.
http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/assets/ 2 01 2 /11/27/pew_arbitration-report.pdf [hereinafter
Banking on Arbitration] (noting that while "checking accounts are the cornerstone of household
financial management[] ... consumers often are unaware of the terms of their checking account
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CFPB found that less than 7% of consumers whose credit card agreements
included arbitration provisions understood that they were precluded from
suing the company in court should a dispute arise. 1 7
Given the apparent absence of perfect competition in these industries, it
is not too surprising to hear that in fact some companies collaborated with
one another to impose arbitration on consumers. The New York Times
described how, in 1999, banking attorney Alan Kaplinsky joined forces
with attorneys at another banking firm to consider whether and how
arbitration might be used to protect their clients from class actions.' 1 8
The group sponsored multiple meetings that included representatives from
companies such as Bank of America, Chase, Citigroup, Discover, Sears,
Toyota, and General Electric. The Times reporters found that the group
met more than a dozen times over the next three years in an effort to use
explicit arbitral class action prohibitions "to kill class actions and send
plaintiffs' lawyers to the. 'employment lines.""" By the end of this
period, many of the companies had adopted arbitration clauses banning
class actions.1 2 0 This hardly has the ring of perfect competition in action.
When the conditions of perfect competition are not met, then
regulation can be justified to protect consumers from the excesses of
imperfect competition.12 1  In particular, given the realities of consumer
markets, including particularly the lack of information and the practical
difficulty in switching products, it seems highly unlikely that the forces of
perfect competition will ensure that the market protects all consumers,
absent regulation.
agreements" and specifically that many are unaware of account agreements restricting their right to
go to court).
117. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 10, § 3.1, at 3. These
results are largely consistent with other studies. See generally, Sovern, supra note 116, at 2 (finding a
"profound lack of understanding about the existence and effect of arbitration agreements among
consumers"); see also Banking on Arbitraion, supra note 116, at 1 (noting while "checking accounts are
the cornerstone of household financial management ... consumers often are unaware of the terms of
their checking account agreements" and, that many are unaware of account agreements restricting
their right to court to go to court).
118. Silver-Greenberg & Gebeloff, supra note 20. Mr. Kaplinsky, an attorney at the large
Philadelphia law firm Ballard Spahr, also argued at about this time that arbitration and class actions
were inherently inconsistent. See Kaplinsky, supra note 35, at 639 (urging arbitrable disputes may not
proceed by way of class action, either in court or in arbitration, unless the arbitration agreement
expressly allows for arbitration).
119. Silver-Greenberg & Gebeloff, supra note 20.
120. Id.
121. See Neil W. Averitt & Robert H. Lande, Consumer Choice: The Practical Reasonfor Both Antitrust
and Consumer Protection Law, 10 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 44, 48-50 (1998) (scrutinizing the concepts
of perfect competition and consumer choice, and concluding that interference with the market
through legislation is necessary to ensure "consumer welfare").
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The same economics that oppose regulation in the presence of perfect
competition instead justify regulation where, as here, the conditions for
perfect competition do not exist. Some regulations, such as antitrust law,
are used to directly prohibit monopolies or other forms of imperfect
competition. 1 22 Other regulations, like those governing appropriate safety
of consumer products, or marketing of medicines, or airplane safety, are
designed to provide protection that an unregulated imperfect market
would not provide.1 2 3  In the consumer financial context, it appears that
regulation is needed to prevent companies from taking advantage of
consumers through class action prohibitions.
Some have argued that regulation of consumer arbitration will likely
harm consumers by causing prices and interest rates to increase.1 2 4
However, absent perfect competition, such regulation may well cause
prices to drop or stay the same rather than rise.1 25  Consistent with this
analysis, the CFPB study showed that when companies in one consumer
financial market were precluded from imposing binding arbitration on
their customers, in fact those companies' prices did not rise.1 2 6  In
particular, CFPB examined a naturally occurring experiment of a sort
where "certain credit card issuers agreed to remove pre-dispute arbitration
clauses from their consumer credit card contracts for at least three and
one-half years."127 CFPB compared data from before and after that
settlement and found no evidence that companies that had eliminated
arbitration raised their prices any more than companies that did not
eliminate arbitration provisions.' 2 8
122. See general RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW (2d ed. 2001) (explaining antitrust laws
preclude imperfect competition such as monopolies).
123. See GOODWIN, supra note 107, at 116-17 (observing that existence of market failures
provide justification for market regulation); PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 107, at 667-84
(8th ed. 2013) (discussing various means of regulation designed to counter externalities);
NICHOLSON & SNYDER, supra note 109, at 691-92 (discussing the system of taxation that could be
used to correct market misallocations).
124. See, e.g., Arbitration Under Assault, supra note 105 (suggesting the price of doing business in
America will rise).
125. See id (stating analysis shows "[a]rbitration tends to reduce consumer prices"). That is, the
regulation of a non-competitive market may enhance competition and, thus, cause prices to decrease.
Id. Of course, minimizing prices is by no means the only goal of regulation. Providing safe and good
products and services is important as well. Id.
126. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 10, § 10, at 5-6
(discussing a study of credit card issuers that removed arbitration clauses from consumer contracts
and finding no evidence of increased prices).
127. Id at 5 10, at 5.
128. Id. at 5 10, at 6 finding no evidence that such companies increased prices or reduced the
amount of credit they offered to consumers).
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In sum, where, as in the consumer financial markets, perfect
competition is absent, regulation is easily justified.
2. Externalities
Economic theory also provides an additional justification for the work
of the CFPB with respect to mandatory arbitration. Apart from the lack
of perfect competition, regulation may also be appropriate to protect the
interests of parties who are not direct participants in a transaction that
nonetheless affects them. That is, two or more parties may enter into a
relationship that also has an impact on others. Economists state
"externalities occur because economic actors have effects on third parties
that are not reflected in market transactions." 1 2 9 Externalities can be
either positive or negative, as third parties can be either benefited or
harmed by the actions of others.1 30 Thus, when a consumer buys a car
that pollutes the environment, the pollution is a negative externality that
affects many parties in addition to the buyer and seller of the car.1 ' 1 Yet,
absent regulation, the full cost of pollution will not be incorporated into
the price of the car.1 3 2
Like pollution, an arbitral class action prohibition can have a negative
impact on persons not a party to the underlying consumer contract.' 3 3 As
has been discussed, our legal system relies on class actions, in part, to help
enforce our laws and deter delinquent behavior. 1 3  Thus, if companies
are able to use arbitral class action waivers to avoid being sued in class
actions, such companies may more frequently violate laws regulating
consumer financial transactions than they would have done had they
feared being sued. Such delinquent behavior would harm not only
consumers who are presently covered by the arbitration clauses but also
future consumers or even others who might be indirectly impacted.1 3
129. NICHOLSON & SNYDER, supra note 109, at 683.
130. "[E]xternalities are side effects, positive or negative, of a economic transaction that affect
those not directly involved in the transaction." GOODWIN, supra note 107, at 293.
131. In contrast, a group of friends who play music in the park for one another will create a
positive externality for those nearby persons who appreciate their music.
132. NICHOLSON & SNYDER, supra note 109, at 715-16 (12th ed. 2016) (discussing pollution
abatement as a form of externality).
133. See Wendy Netter Epstein, Contract Theoy and the Failures of Pubc-Private Contracting,
34 CARDOZo L. REV. 2211, 2231 (2013) ("An externality is an effect that a transaction between one
set of parties puts on other parties who were not a part of the deal.").
134. See Carnegie v. Household Int'l, 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004) (explaining class actions
allow more claimants and therefore are more likely to "yield substantial economics in litigation").
135. See GOODWIN, supra note 107, at 261 (identifying externalities as "side effects" affecting
unintended third parties).
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For example, imagine a scenario in which a bank used an arbitral class
action prohibition to prevent customers from using a class action to sue
over racially discriminatory lending practices. Further, imagine that the
bank then engaged in such discriminatory practices, that most borrowers
were unaware they had been impacted, and that the few who did realize
they had been discriminated against were unable to bring individual claims
against the bank. In this event, the bank would have engaged in racially
discriminatory behavior that would cause a detrimental impact not only on
directly affected consumers but potentially on their families, friends, and
the public at large, due to the growth of discrimination.' 3 6
In short, regulation can be justified to prevent or discourage the
creation of negative externalities. Thus, to the extent that companies'
imposition of mandatory arbitration clauses containing arbitral class action
waivers harms non-parties to the transaction, regulation is justified.
3. Unequal Resources
Even a perfectly competitive market cannot ameliorate an unequal initial
distribution of resources. Indeed, if we rely too heavily on free markets
and allow the use of unregulated form contracts, we are likely to worsen
these preexisting inequalities. Many decades ago,
Professor Friedrich Kessler explained this well:
Society, when granting freedom of contract, does not guarantee that all
members of the community will be able to make use of it to the same extent.
On the contrary, the law, by protecting the unequal distribution of property,
does nothing to prevent freedom of contract from becoming a one-sided
privilege. . . . Freedom of contract enables enterprisers to legislate by
contract and, what is even more important, to legislate in a substantially
authoritarian manner without using the appearance of authoritarian forms.
Standard contracts in particular could thus become effective instruments in
the hands of powerful industrial and commercial overlords enabling them to
impose a new feudal order of their own making upon a vast host of
vassals. 1 3 7
136. Peggy Radin has also argued that the use of standard form contracts can result in another
type of externality--democratic degradation. MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE
PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW 33-52 (2013); see also W. David Slawson,
Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power, 84 HARV. L. REv. 529, 530 (1971)
(critiquing standard form contracts as non-democratic).
137. Friedrich Kessler, Contracts ofAdhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 Colum.
L. REV. 629, 640 (1943).
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Putting this more concretely, the financial services companies that are
using mandatory arbitration clauses to prevent customers from
participating in collective actions are worsening the unequal distribution of
resources in this country. Thus, we can justify regulation of the practice by
looking to policies that favor a more equal distribution of societal
resources, as well as by policies that favor protecting the public interest
against externalities and policies that favor protecting individuals from
market failures.
B. Psychologv
One can also consider the CFPB regulation through the lens of
cognitive psychology. Even to the perhaps limited extent that consumer
markets are competitive, consumers' psychology will often lead them to be
exploited. As Oren Bar-Gill explains:
Competition, many believe, works to increase efficiency and protect
consumers. But competition does not alleviate the behavioral market failure.
It may even exacerbate it. ... In a competitive market, sellers have no
choice but to align contract design with the psychology of consumers....
Put bluntly, competition forces sellers to exploit the biases and
misperceptions of their customers.' 3 8
In concrete terms, some have suggested that consumers should be
"free" to choose contracts containing arbitration clauses, and even class
action prohibitions, because the consumers may see such clauses as
providing superior benefits such as lower prices.' 3 9  However, the
practical reality of the world is that few if any consumers actually make
such knowing choices, nor can they be expected to do so. The insights of
cognitive psychologists are in this sense another challenge to the
economists' historical view of the world, because it turns out that the
"rational actor" or "homo economicus" hypothesized by economists over
many decades is a rare being indeed. The field of "behavioral economics"
now blends both economic and psychological insights.' 4 0
At least three cognitive issues often prevent consumers from making
fully informed rational decisions as to whether or not an arbitration clause
138. OREN BAR-GILL, SEDUCTION BY CONTRACT 1, 2 (2012).
139. Supra text accompanying note 125.
140. See generally RICHARD H. THALER & L.J. GANSER, MISBEHAVING: THE MAKING OF
BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICs (2016) (describing the blending of economic and psychological insights);
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (2000) (discussing the concept of
behavioral economics).
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containing a class action waiver might serve their best interest:
(1) consumers typically focus on only that information that seems the most
salient; (2) consumers often fail to comprehend clauses contained in
contracts; and (3) consumers tend to be affected by positive illusions that
lead them to downplay the likelihood that a problem may arise and
therefore, also downplay the importance of a dispute resolution clause.
The discussion below addresses these issues both generally and also as
applied to arbitral class action waivers in particular.
Overwhelmed with information in every aspect of their lives, consumers
focus on only the most salient information-that which jumps out at them
and seems urgently important."' When engaging in financial consumer
transactions consumers will probably focus on price or maybe even
interest rates, but it is completely unrealistic to think that consumers
would or could invest the time to delve into the guts of a small print
online contract to look at a dispute resolution clause that might change the
process by which they might resolve future disputes.' 4 2
In light of this general phenomenon, it is unsurprising that consumers
are not typically focused on dispute resolution provisions that might be
contained in small print contracts, envelope stuffers, or online provisions,
particularly where a signature is not necessarily required.' Based on a
national telephonic survey of credit card holders, the CFPB determined
that most consumers did not focus on dispute resolution clauses when
choosing a credit card.z" Rather, using a series of both open- and closed-
ended survey questions, the Bureau found consumers were primarily
concerned with rewards, interest rates, merchants' acceptance of the card,
issuer reputation, and fees. Dispute resolution clauses were the least
important concern in both the open- and closed-ended questioning
surveys.' 4  Another survey asked 648 consumers whether they were
141. See BAR-GILL, supra note 138, at I ("That no one reads the fine print is old news. That
sellers hide one-sided terms in the fine print is not surprising.").
142. See Sovern, supra note 116, at 15-19 (discussing literature showing consumers tend not to
read fine print contracts); see also Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationaity, Standard Form Contracts and
Unconscionabibiy, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1206 (2003) ("Because buyers are boundedly rational rather
than fully rational decision makers, when making purchasing decisions they take into account only a
limited number of product attributes and ignore others."); Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts ofAdhesion: An
Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1179 (1983) (opining that most consumers do not read
contracts of adhesion).
143. Supra text accompanying note 23.
144. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 10, § 3.4.1, at 15
(discussing a study of credit card issuers that removed arbitration clauses from consumer contracts
and determining the existence of an arbitration clause was of little concern to a consumer).
145. See id. ("No respondent mentioned dispute resolution.").
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covered by arbitration provisions, and found that 303 said they were not,
and 244 did not know. 1 4 6 Yet, in reality, close to 90% of the consumers
were covered by arbitration provisions. 1 4  While some who read these
results may be tempted to blame consumers for failing to carefully read
their contracts, cognitive psychologists have pointed out that in fact it is
rational for consumers and others to expend their limited time wisely,
which may well not include carefully reading every lengthy form contract
imposed upon them by a merchant."4
Even assuming consumers were to read dispute resolution contracts
contained in their consumer contracts, they likely would not understand
the provisions.' General studies have shown that consumers typically
lack the capacity to understand the complicated concepts set out in many
consumer contracts.' In the arbitration context, in particular, the CFPB
found that less than 7% of consumers whose credit card agreements
included arbitration provisions understood that they were precluded from
suing the company in court should a dispute arise.'"' Another study
showed 668 consumers a typical credit card arbitration provision
containing a class action waiver and then asked the consumers. questions
about the clause.' 5 2  Less than 9% of the surveyed consumers recognized
that the contractual clause contained an arbitration provision that would
146. Sovem, supra note 116, at 59-60.
147. See id at 60 (claiming 8 9% of those surveyed were party to at least the arbitration
agreement).
148. See Bagchi, supra note 106, at 8; see also Yannis Bakos et al., Does Anyone Read the Fine Print?
Consumer Attention to Standard-Form Contracts, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 2 (2014) (observing that, in many
circumstances, a majority of buyers do not read the fine print); Victoria S. Plaut & Robert P. Bartlett
III, Blind Consent? A Social Pychological Investigation of Non-Readership of Click-Through Agreements, 36 L. &
HUM. BEHAV. 293, 298 (2011) (reporting that 90% of surveyed consumers stated they did not read
click-through agreements); Debra Pogrund Stark & Jessica M. Choplin, A License to Deceive: Enforcing
Contractual Myths Despite Consumer Pychological Realities, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 617, 694-700 (2009)
(reporting on consumers' acknowledged failure to read contracts in many contexts).
149. See Sovern, supra note 116, at.20-24 (discussing consumers' frequent lack of
comprehension of contract terms); Debra Pogrund Stark & Jessica M. Choplin, A Cognitive and Social
Pychological Anaysis of Disclosure Laws and Call for Mortgage Counseng to Prevent PredatoU Lending
16 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 85, 97-102 (2010) (examining numerous cognitive and social
psychological factors that cause many disclosures to be ineffective).
150. Alan M. White & Cathy Lesser Mansfield, Literag and Contract, 13 STAN. L. & POL. REV.
233, 235 (2002) (drawing on a National Adult Literacy Survey to conclude that even those consumers
who take the time to read contracts are still unlikely to understand them).
151. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 10, at § 3.4.3 at 18
(discussing a survey in which only 6.2% of respondents understood they would not have a right to
sue but rather must arbitrate).
152. Sovern, supra note 116, at 4.
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prevent them from bringing a claim in court, should they wish to do so.'s"
And, with respect to arbitral class action waivers, the same study found
that four times as many subjects thought the clause did not prevent them
from participating in class actions as compared to the group who thought
class actions were blocked, even though the class action waiver was
printed twice in the contract, including once in italics and once in ALL
CAPS."s Further, it is likely that the consumers in the study, who were
provided a single contract and asked to read it, reviewed that contract far
more thoroughly than a typical consumer reviews their contracts.1ss
Finally, even to the very limited extent consumers both focus on and
understand an arbitration clause, they are highly unlikely to assess its
importance correctly due to their positive illusions. In study after study
cognitive psychologists have found that people tend to be overly
optimistic about their future."s' Thus, it can be anticipated that a
consumer who is entering into a financial transaction will not be thinking
about the fact that the company might try to discriminate or impose an
unlawful term such that the consumer would possibly want to bring a legal
claim. Because the consumer is not focused on possibly needing to bring a
lawsuit against the company, the consumer will not place adequate
emphasis on the need to ensure that she will be able to feasibly bring a
claim against the company.
These psychological realities are a further justification for regulation. If
consumers cannot be expected to focus on, understand, or properly
153. Id.
154. Id. at 2.
155. Id. at 33. Admittedly it is also possible that the survey group paid less attention to the
contract than they would have in a real life situation because the contract and its terms would not
directly affect them. Id.
156. See generally JENNIFER K. ROBBENNOLT & JEAN R. STERNLIGHT, PSYCHOLOGY FOR
LAWYERS: UNDERSTANDING THE HUMAN FACTORS IN NEGOTIATION, LITIGATION, AND
DECISION MAKING 68-71 (2012) (examining how overconfidence in the future leads to insufficient
preparation for negative events). This phenomenon is also demonstrated in a series of Prudential
Insurance advertisements. These advertisements urge people to do a better job of saving for the
future and buying insurance, emphasizing that people tend to be overly optimistic about events in
their life, and that people tend to save less than they ought to in light of their actual needs. See
Prudential TV Spot, 'The Prudential Dominoes Expeiment," 1SPOT.TV (Dec. 2, 2015, 3:26 AM),
https://www.ispot.tv/ad/7Cj6/prudential-the-prudential-dominoes-experiment (demonstrating the
benefits that saving small amounts of money can have on retirement); The Prudential Magnets
Expenment, YOUTUBE (Feb. 25, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watchv=o3pFHPgH3oU
(depicting people's tendency to think optimistically despite negative past experience). See also
Advertising Psycholop-or an Advertising Psychologist, AM. SCi.: A TEAM BLOG,
http://americanscience.blogspot.com/ 2 013/02/advertising-psychologyor-advertising.htm-l (referring
to the behavioral economics theory "temporal discounting" and how it explains why people do not
plan for the future) (last visited Dec. 18, 2016).
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evaluate dispute resolution clauses then it is appropriate for the
government to step in to protect them from a potentially harmful practice.
C. Political Philosophy
Critics of government regulation might see the concept of "autonomy"
as their ultimate and irrefutable argument against CFPB regulation of
consumers' arbitration contracts. Recent Supreme Court jurisprudence
has emphasized that "arbitration is a matter of contract,""'7 and that
courts must "'rigorously enforce' arbitration agreements according to their
terms."' Multiple commentators have urged that this jurisprudence is
based on the transcendent principle of party autonomy.' 59 Those who
accept such an argument might say individuals should be "free" to enter
contracts of their own "choosing."160 However, in addition to the doubts
cast on actual "choosing" by the economics and psychology, as briefly
discussed above, it turns out that "freedom" or "autonomy" to enter
contracts is not such a simple concept after all.
In a wonderful recent article, Professor Hiro Aragaki draws on political
philosophy to "question whether the autonomy thesis points
unproblematically in the direction of enforcing arbitration agreements with
minimal regulation by the state."' Aragaki shows that once one takes a
serious look at autonomy, one sees it is a very complex concept that "can
mean many different things and that, depending on the conception of
autonomy to which one subscribes, autonomy might require not freedom
of contract but rather freedom from contract."' Yet, Aragaki notes,
"Although philosophers have for a long time sought to understand the
multiple and often conflicting ways of understanding autonomy, courts
157. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2309 (2013).
158. Id. (quoting Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985)); see also Glover,
supra note 104, at 3070 (stating the Supreme Court's recent arbitration decisions demonstrate a "pure
freedom of contract" perspective).
159. See Edward Brunet, The Core Values of Arbitration, in ARBITRATION LAW IN AMERICA: A
CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 1, 5 (2006) (describing arbitration as an advantage for "self-governance" and
customization); Thomas J. Stipanowich, The'Arbitration Penumbra: Arbitration Law and the Rapid#
Changing Landscape of Dispute Resolution, 8 NEV. L.J. 427, 430 (2007) (observing that arbitration law
promotes party autonomy); Stephen J. Ware, Vacating lagal#-Erroneous Arbitration Awards, 6 Y.B. ON
ARB. & MEDIATION 56, 92 (2014) (asserting autonomy is arbitration's "essential virtue").
160. See Alan Scott Rau, Integrity in PrivateJudging, 38 S. TEx. L. REV. 485, 486 (1997) (asserting
that arbitration serves purposes of private ordering and self-determination); Consumer Arbitration As
Exceptional Consumer Law, supra note 103, 211 ("What is the benefit of being able to alienate rights?
Perhaps a sufficient explanation is that it is essential to freedom or autonomy.").
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and commentators writing in the arbitration area have paid comparatively
little attention to these nuances" 1 6 3  and thus "have been led to
overestimate the persuasiveness of the autonomy thesis in justifying the
rigorous enforcement of arbitration agreements."' 6 4
In brief, the political philosophers discussed by Aragaki and others have
explained that autonomy can be viewed in either negative or positive
terms. 1 65  Negative autonomy is basically the libertarian idea that one
should be let alone-the absence of external coercion by the state or other
private parties'66 and the idea of "Don't Tread on Me."' 6 7  In contrast,
positive liberty is a more complex and some would say robust concept.
Political theorist Ian Carter defines "positive liberty" as "the possibility of
acting-or the fact of acting-in such a way as to take control of one's life
and realize one's fundamental purposes." 161 Political philosopher Isaiah
Berlin puts it as follows:
The "positive" sense of the word "liberty" derives from the wish on the part
of the individual to be his own master. I wish my life and decisions to
depend on myself, not on external forces of whatever kind. I wish to be the
instrument of my own, not of other men's acts of will. I wish to be a
subject, not an object; to be moved by reasons, by conscious purposes,
which are my own, not by causes which affect me, as it were, from
outside.' 6 9
Professor Aragaki explains more simply that positive liberty is "a type of
self-governance"' 7 0 or "capacity for self-government."' 7 1
163. Id.
164. Id. at 1145.
165. See id. at 1148 (drawing a distinction between negative and positive conceptions of liberty
but also recognizing that this concept itself has been subject to "extensive criticism'). See generally
ISAIAH BERLIN, FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY (1990) (distinguishing negative and positive conceptions
of liberty); see also Aragaki, supra note 161, at 1148 (drawing distinction between negative and positive
conceptions of liberty but also recognizing that this concept itself has been subject to "extensive
criticism'.
166. See F.A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 16-17 (1960) (defining liberty as
absence of constraint and restraint); ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA, at ix (1974)
(arguing in favor of a minimalist state so as to maximize individual freedom and rights).
167. See The Gadden Fla WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gadsdenflag
(last updated Sept. 8, 2016, 11:48 PM) (describing the flag as a symbol of libertarian philosophy).
168. Ian Carter, Posiive and Negaive Liberey, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (Feb. 27, 2003),
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/iberty-positive-negative.
169. Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Libery, in LIBERTY: INCORPORATING FOUR ESSAYS ON
LIBERTY 166, 178 (Henry Hardy ed., 2002).
170. Aragaki, supra note 161, at 1146.
171. Id. at 1156.
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While people undoubtedly differ regarding the concept or concepts of
liberty we find most compelling, it is not clear that the CFPB's and
Congress's efforts to regulate arbitration are inconsistent with any
definition of liberty. As Professor Aragaki explains, "negative liberty
presents at best an awkward justification for the rigorous enforcement of
arbitration agreements." In essence whereas negative liberty arguments
are potentially powerful as arrayed against regulations that prohibit people
from acting as they wish, regulations of arbitration do not have that
character. Rather, the CFPB regulation does not prevent disputants from
arbitrating but would only prevent a company from using the power of the
state and courts to force an unwilling consumer into arbitration.173
As for positive liberty, Professor Aragaki finds that enforcing an
arbitration agreement against an unwilling party can be seen as consistent
with positive liberty, just as Odysseus' request to be tied to the mast can be
seen as consistent with positive liberty.1 7 4 In both instances someone
potentially makes a decision to limit liberty to more consciously control his
own fate. Significantly, the reality of arbitration, and particularly forced
arbitration, is not consistent with the ambitious goals of positive liberty.
Professor Aragaki points out that particularly in the context of adhesive
arbitration contracts one can hardly say that individuals are making an
informed reflective decision to enter into an arbitration agreement.17 5
And, if entering such a contract does not promote positive liberty then
using legislation or regulation to block such contracts is not inconsistent
with positive liberty. Rather, because the proposed CFPB regulation
blocks a pre-dispute arbitral agreement that prohibits class actions, but still
leaves disputants free to devise arbitration to their liking after the dispute
has arisen, it could even be argued that the CFPB regulation furthers
rather than interferes with positive liberty.17 1
In short, when one reflects more deeply on the political philosophy of
autonomy, one sees that interfering with companies' use of adhesive
contracts to impose arbitral class action waivers on their consumers does
172. Id. at 1162.
173. See id. at 1162-75 (observing that enforcing a contract against even a breaching party is not
consistent with promoting that party's negative liberty).
174. Id. at 1182-83 (citing GERALD DwoRKIN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY
14-15 (1988)).
175. Id at 1184-85.
176. Professor Aragaki makes a similar argument with respect to the proposed AFA, which
would not categorically prohibit arbitration but rather require disputants to agree to arbitration post-
dispute, at which time the parties that could make a more considered reflective judgment as to
whether they wanted to arbitrate their dispute. Id at 1186.
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not, in any meaningful sense, interfere with consumers' liberty or
autonomy. Rather, government's regulation of this practice can actually be
seen as consistent with autonomy because in prohibiting companies from
forcing consumers to give up certain rights, pre-dispute, the regulation
leaves consumers free to knowingly and voluntarily accept arbitration,
individual or otherwise, on a post-dispute basis.
V. CONCLUSION
In raising the dreaded specter of Lochner in connection with the
Supreme Court's decisions on forced arbitration, Justice Ginsburg has
asked just the right question: Is it appropriate for courts to use purported
principles of freedom and autonomy to prevent government from
protecting consumers from the unfair aspects of arbitration that are forced
upon them contractually by powerful companies? To the contrary, this
Essay has shown that the CFPB's regulation proscribing financial
companies from using forced arbitration to prevent consumers from
participating in class actions is consistent with principles of economics,
psychology, and political philosophy supporting autonomy. The concept
of "liberty of contract" may work well in some contexts but certainly not
in all. Where economic forces or the limits of human psychology prevent
individuals from knowledgeably protecting their own self-interest, it is
entirely appropriate for a government agency or legislative body to act to
protect those interests. In this sense, financial consumers' circumstances
make them a "poster child" for the benefits of regulation. Indeed, without
wanting to get overly romantic about it, one might even say that the
CFPB's regulation supports true freedom.
Once it is clear that regulation is appropriate, of course debate can be
had regarding the content of that regulation. While reasonable people
might differ over whether the particular regulation the CFPB came up with
is perfect, or even very good, it is clear that the regulation is reasonable
and well-supported by the CFPB's comprehensive study of how pre-
dispute arbitration is being used in the consumer financial sector. More
studies will undoubtedly be done, and the CFPB or other regulators may
change the way that forced arbitration is being regulated in the financial
sector. But, Congress and the CFPB have taken a great first step in this
area by recognizing the need for regulation when individual consumers are
not in a position to protect their own interests. Thus, hurrah for the
CFPB! By acting to protect financial consumers, it has taken steps to
serve the interests of justice.
3752016]
376 ST. MARY'S LA WJOURNAL [Vol. 48:343
